2024
Murphy, Colleen; Wexler, Lesley
Non-State Punishment Journal Article
In: University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 2024, iss. 3, pp. 819-892, 2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: amnesties, punishment, transitional justice
@article{Wexler2024,
title = {Non-State Punishment},
author = {Colleen Murphy and Lesley Wexler },
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4591601, Download article from SSRN},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-07-01},
urldate = {2024-07-01},
journal = {University of Illinois Law Review},
volume = {2024},
issue = {3},
pages = {819-892},
abstract = {How should we think about the Jewish community’s punishment of Jewish kapos, councilmembers, and police officers after the Holocaust? Or of Americans who fire, divorce, or shun participants in the January 6 attempted auto-coup? In the American context, the invocation of ‘cancel culture’ or ‘wokeness’ reflects concern about the defensibility of non-state practices of accountability. Setting aside for our purposes an analysis of the political uses and abuses of these terms, we focus here on a presumption underlying these complaints: actors are impermissibly, illegitimately, and disproportionately being held to account by non-state actors.
Citizens, corporations, and civil society organizations are vocally and visibly taking accountability for wrongdoing into their own hands. Such non-state accountability practices are particularly fraught because they raise fundamental questions about the proper regulatory role of the state and of law with respect to private responses to wrongdoing. Theories of criminal punishment currently explain why the state can and ought to respond to certain categories of criminal wrongdoing and the unique standing of the state to punish in the form of incarceration. However, such theories do not provide straightforward guidance for non-state punishment as regards: who has the standing to engage in punishment; what would constitute adequate due process; and how to assess proportionality.
To begin to address the range of issues non-state punishment raises, we argue it is a mistake to lump into a single normative category all practices of non-state punishment. This paper provides a conceptual map of four categories of punishment: ordinary state punishment, ordinary non-state punishment, transitional state punishment, and transitional non-state punishment. The map distinguishes punishment along two dimensions, which affect the specific questions of standing and justifiability to which a given instance of punishment gives rise. The first dimension is the type of justice punishment promotes (ordinary justice or transitional justice). The second dimension is the agent meting out punishment (state actors or non-state actors). Each category of punishment faces distinct questions of standing and justifiability.
Our conceptual map makes four contributions. First, it adds to a burgeoning discussion in legal theory and philosophy grounded in a recognition that the state does not have a monopoly over punishment. Second, it supplements an ongoing discussion in transitional justice literature and practice that emphasizes the problems with placing the state as the focal point of transitional justice. Our third contribution is to provide a framework for understanding and assessing American ‘cancel culture.’ For the universe of cancel culture cases that count as punishment, some cases are cases of ordinary non-state punishment, while others are cases of non-state transitional punishment. As we discuss, some pushback on so-called American cancel culture is category confusion or contestation about the need for transitional rather than ordinary justice and disagreement about which type of punishment, is in fact, occurring. Our framework also provides resources for the critical evaluation of defenses or critiques advanced of particular cases of non-state punishment. Fourth, our analysis of punishment provides a model that can be used to conceptualize other processes of accountability pursued by state and non-state actors, including reparations and truth-telling.},
keywords = {amnesties, punishment, transitional justice},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
How should we think about the Jewish community’s punishment of Jewish kapos, councilmembers, and police officers after the Holocaust? Or of Americans who fire, divorce, or shun participants in the January 6 attempted auto-coup? In the American context, the invocation of ‘cancel culture’ or ‘wokeness’ reflects concern about the defensibility of non-state practices of accountability. Setting aside for our purposes an analysis of the political uses and abuses of these terms, we focus here on a presumption underlying these complaints: actors are impermissibly, illegitimately, and disproportionately being held to account by non-state actors.
Citizens, corporations, and civil society organizations are vocally and visibly taking accountability for wrongdoing into their own hands. Such non-state accountability practices are particularly fraught because they raise fundamental questions about the proper regulatory role of the state and of law with respect to private responses to wrongdoing. Theories of criminal punishment currently explain why the state can and ought to respond to certain categories of criminal wrongdoing and the unique standing of the state to punish in the form of incarceration. However, such theories do not provide straightforward guidance for non-state punishment as regards: who has the standing to engage in punishment; what would constitute adequate due process; and how to assess proportionality.
To begin to address the range of issues non-state punishment raises, we argue it is a mistake to lump into a single normative category all practices of non-state punishment. This paper provides a conceptual map of four categories of punishment: ordinary state punishment, ordinary non-state punishment, transitional state punishment, and transitional non-state punishment. The map distinguishes punishment along two dimensions, which affect the specific questions of standing and justifiability to which a given instance of punishment gives rise. The first dimension is the type of justice punishment promotes (ordinary justice or transitional justice). The second dimension is the agent meting out punishment (state actors or non-state actors). Each category of punishment faces distinct questions of standing and justifiability.
Our conceptual map makes four contributions. First, it adds to a burgeoning discussion in legal theory and philosophy grounded in a recognition that the state does not have a monopoly over punishment. Second, it supplements an ongoing discussion in transitional justice literature and practice that emphasizes the problems with placing the state as the focal point of transitional justice. Our third contribution is to provide a framework for understanding and assessing American ‘cancel culture.’ For the universe of cancel culture cases that count as punishment, some cases are cases of ordinary non-state punishment, while others are cases of non-state transitional punishment. As we discuss, some pushback on so-called American cancel culture is category confusion or contestation about the need for transitional rather than ordinary justice and disagreement about which type of punishment, is in fact, occurring. Our framework also provides resources for the critical evaluation of defenses or critiques advanced of particular cases of non-state punishment. Fourth, our analysis of punishment provides a model that can be used to conceptualize other processes of accountability pursued by state and non-state actors, including reparations and truth-telling.
Citizens, corporations, and civil society organizations are vocally and visibly taking accountability for wrongdoing into their own hands. Such non-state accountability practices are particularly fraught because they raise fundamental questions about the proper regulatory role of the state and of law with respect to private responses to wrongdoing. Theories of criminal punishment currently explain why the state can and ought to respond to certain categories of criminal wrongdoing and the unique standing of the state to punish in the form of incarceration. However, such theories do not provide straightforward guidance for non-state punishment as regards: who has the standing to engage in punishment; what would constitute adequate due process; and how to assess proportionality.
To begin to address the range of issues non-state punishment raises, we argue it is a mistake to lump into a single normative category all practices of non-state punishment. This paper provides a conceptual map of four categories of punishment: ordinary state punishment, ordinary non-state punishment, transitional state punishment, and transitional non-state punishment. The map distinguishes punishment along two dimensions, which affect the specific questions of standing and justifiability to which a given instance of punishment gives rise. The first dimension is the type of justice punishment promotes (ordinary justice or transitional justice). The second dimension is the agent meting out punishment (state actors or non-state actors). Each category of punishment faces distinct questions of standing and justifiability.
Our conceptual map makes four contributions. First, it adds to a burgeoning discussion in legal theory and philosophy grounded in a recognition that the state does not have a monopoly over punishment. Second, it supplements an ongoing discussion in transitional justice literature and practice that emphasizes the problems with placing the state as the focal point of transitional justice. Our third contribution is to provide a framework for understanding and assessing American ‘cancel culture.’ For the universe of cancel culture cases that count as punishment, some cases are cases of ordinary non-state punishment, while others are cases of non-state transitional punishment. As we discuss, some pushback on so-called American cancel culture is category confusion or contestation about the need for transitional rather than ordinary justice and disagreement about which type of punishment, is in fact, occurring. Our framework also provides resources for the critical evaluation of defenses or critiques advanced of particular cases of non-state punishment. Fourth, our analysis of punishment provides a model that can be used to conceptualize other processes of accountability pursued by state and non-state actors, including reparations and truth-telling.
2023
Murphy, Colleen
Minimum Moral Thresholds at War’s End Book Chapter
In: Parsons, Graham; Wilson, Mark A. (Ed.): How to End a War; Essays on Justice, Peace, and Repair, pp. 92–110, Cambridge University Press, 2023, ISBN: 9781108992640.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: armed conflict, ethics, just war theory, transitional justice
@inbook{Murphy2023b,
title = {Minimum Moral Thresholds at War’s End},
author = {Colleen Murphy},
editor = {Graham Parsons and Mark A. Wilson},
doi = {10.1017/9781108992640.006},
isbn = {9781108992640},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-09},
urldate = {2023-03-09},
booktitle = {How to End a War; Essays on Justice, Peace, and Repair},
pages = {92--110},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
abstract = {This chapter explores the normative lessons offered by the structurally analogous descriptive and normative limitations of just war theory and transitional justice. Just war theory provides normative prescriptions for the onset, conduct during, ending, and aftermath of war. Transitional justice provides normative prescriptions for dealing with widespread human rights violations characteristically committed during conflict and/or periods of repression. Both just war theory and transitional justice provide normative prescriptions for profoundly non-ideal circumstances. Yet a yawning gap remains between the normative picture of just war and of transitional justice on the one hand, and the descriptive reality of contemporary conflicts and transitional justice practices on the other. To engage with the reality of each practice in a way that will prove actionable for its participants, new forms of normative guidance are needed.
},
keywords = {armed conflict, ethics, just war theory, transitional justice},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
This chapter explores the normative lessons offered by the structurally analogous descriptive and normative limitations of just war theory and transitional justice. Just war theory provides normative prescriptions for the onset, conduct during, ending, and aftermath of war. Transitional justice provides normative prescriptions for dealing with widespread human rights violations characteristically committed during conflict and/or periods of repression. Both just war theory and transitional justice provide normative prescriptions for profoundly non-ideal circumstances. Yet a yawning gap remains between the normative picture of just war and of transitional justice on the one hand, and the descriptive reality of contemporary conflicts and transitional justice practices on the other. To engage with the reality of each practice in a way that will prove actionable for its participants, new forms of normative guidance are needed.
Radzik, Linda; Murphy, Colleen
Reconciliation Book Section
In: Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (Ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: amnesties, apologies, deliberative processes, lustration, memorials, normative standards, punishment, reconciliation, reparations, trials, truth telling
@incollection{sep-reconciliation,
title = {Reconciliation},
author = {Linda Radzik and Colleen Murphy},
editor = {Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reconciliation/, Entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-01},
urldate = {2023-01-01},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
edition = {Fall 2023},
abstract = {This entry treats the topic of reconciliation in a manner that respects its significance across moral (viz. interpersonal and private), legal and political contexts. Many of the issues and debates that arise in the literature on reconciliation are relevant to each of these contexts. However, issues that are specific to political contexts, where the philosophical literature on reconciliation is most extensive, will receive special attention.},
howpublished = {urlhttps://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/reconciliation/},
keywords = {amnesties, apologies, deliberative processes, lustration, memorials, normative standards, punishment, reconciliation, reparations, trials, truth telling},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
This entry treats the topic of reconciliation in a manner that respects its significance across moral (viz. interpersonal and private), legal and political contexts. Many of the issues and debates that arise in the literature on reconciliation are relevant to each of these contexts. However, issues that are specific to political contexts, where the philosophical literature on reconciliation is most extensive, will receive special attention.
2021
Boakye, Jessica; Murphy, Colleen; Gardoni, Paolo; Kumar, Ramesh
Which consequences matter in risk analysis and disaster assessment? Journal Article
In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, vol. 71, 2021, ISSN: 2212-4209.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: capability approach, disaster assessment, risk, risk analysis
@article{Boakye2022,
title = {Which consequences matter in risk analysis and disaster assessment?},
author = {Jessica Boakye and Colleen Murphy and Paolo Gardoni and Ramesh Kumar},
doi = {10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102740},
issn = {2212-4209},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-20},
urldate = {2021-12-20},
journal = {International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction},
volume = {71},
publisher = {Elsevier BV},
abstract = {Extreme events (like earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires) can create significant physical damage to structures and infrastructure, downtime and business interruptions, economic losses, and casualties. The assessment of the consequences of past extreme events and the prediction of the consequences of future extreme events has typically focused on these types of consequences. However, the consequences of extreme events typically exceed these more immediately evident consequences. The societal consequences are complex and multi-faceted, affecting financial, economic, and physical aspects of individual well-being such as psychological trauma, missed work and school opportunities. Yet due to restrictions on time and resources, not every possible consequence of an extreme event can be included in risk analysis or impact analysis. To assess the societal impact of extreme events, it is critical to first determine which consequences should be considered (measured for disasters and predicted for hazards.) This paper develops a comprehensive list of which consequences need to be considered. We provide a theoretical justification for the list by adopting a capability approach for extreme event consequences. The list of consequences is meant to go beyond the traditional metrics of infrastructure damage and downtime. We show how the developed list incorporates the diverse insights of recent work expanding the consequences of extreme events. The proposed list is general and can be used within different assessment approaches.},
keywords = {capability approach, disaster assessment, risk, risk analysis},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Extreme events (like earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires) can create significant physical damage to structures and infrastructure, downtime and business interruptions, economic losses, and casualties. The assessment of the consequences of past extreme events and the prediction of the consequences of future extreme events has typically focused on these types of consequences. However, the consequences of extreme events typically exceed these more immediately evident consequences. The societal consequences are complex and multi-faceted, affecting financial, economic, and physical aspects of individual well-being such as psychological trauma, missed work and school opportunities. Yet due to restrictions on time and resources, not every possible consequence of an extreme event can be included in risk analysis or impact analysis. To assess the societal impact of extreme events, it is critical to first determine which consequences should be considered (measured for disasters and predicted for hazards.) This paper develops a comprehensive list of which consequences need to be considered. We provide a theoretical justification for the list by adopting a capability approach for extreme event consequences. The list of consequences is meant to go beyond the traditional metrics of infrastructure damage and downtime. We show how the developed list incorporates the diverse insights of recent work expanding the consequences of extreme events. The proposed list is general and can be used within different assessment approaches.
2020
Murphy, Colleen
III—On Principled Compromise: When Does a Process of Transitional Justice Qualify as Just? Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 120, no. 1, pp. 47–70, 2020, ISSN: 1467-9264.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: compromises, transitional justice
@article{Murphy2020,
title = {III—On Principled Compromise: When Does a Process of Transitional Justice Qualify as Just?},
author = {Colleen Murphy},
doi = {10.1093/arisoc/aoaa003},
issn = {1467-9264},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-04-01},
urldate = {2020-04-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
volume = {120},
number = {1},
pages = {47--70},
publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
abstract = {Processes of transitional justice (for instance, amnesty, truth commissions, reparations, trials) deal with large-scale wrongdoing committed during extended periods of conflict or repression. This paper discusses three common moral objections to processes of transitional justice, which I label shaking hands with the devil, selling victims short, and entrenching the status quo. Given the scale of wrongdoing and the context in which transitional justice processes are adopted, compromise is necessary. To respond to these objections, I argue, it is necessary to articulate the conditions that make a compromise principled. I defend three criteria that distinguish principled from unprincipled compromises.},
keywords = {compromises, transitional justice},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Processes of transitional justice (for instance, amnesty, truth commissions, reparations, trials) deal with large-scale wrongdoing committed during extended periods of conflict or repression. This paper discusses three common moral objections to processes of transitional justice, which I label shaking hands with the devil, selling victims short, and entrenching the status quo. Given the scale of wrongdoing and the context in which transitional justice processes are adopted, compromise is necessary. To respond to these objections, I argue, it is necessary to articulate the conditions that make a compromise principled. I defend three criteria that distinguish principled from unprincipled compromises.
2019
Doorn, Neelke; Gardoni, Paolo; Murphy, Colleen
A multidisciplinary definition and evaluation of resilience: the role of social justice in defining resilience Journal Article
In: Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 112–123, 2019, ISSN: 2378-9697.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: capability approach, critical infrastructures, disasters, engineering, natural hazards, philosophy, risk, social justice, well-being
@article{Doorn2018,
title = {A multidisciplinary definition and evaluation of resilience: the role of social justice in defining resilience},
author = {Neelke Doorn and Paolo Gardoni and Colleen Murphy},
url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=4887867, SSRN},
doi = {10.1080/23789689.2018.1428162},
issn = {2378-9697},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-07-03},
urldate = {2019-07-03},
journal = {Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure},
volume = {4},
number = {3},
pages = {112--123},
publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
abstract = {This paper aims to explore how insights from the philosophical and social science literature can be incorporated into the definition of resilient infrastructure so that considerations of social justice can be accounted for and addressed more adequately. Building on the view that engineering ultimately aims to promote societal well-being, this paper argues that human well-being depends on (1) the resilience of the physical infrastructure and (2) the socioeconomic context, both of which in turn affect (i) how the impact and recovery of the physical infrastructure translates into societal impact and recovery and (ii) the ability of individuals to recover/adapt independently from the recovery of the physical infrastructure. The paper suggests that a capability approach may be a suitable framework for providing content to the formal concept of resilience as a capability approach is especially suitable for expressing non-tangible damage that might be caused by natural hazards and disasters.},
keywords = {capability approach, critical infrastructures, disasters, engineering, natural hazards, philosophy, risk, social justice, well-being},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This paper aims to explore how insights from the philosophical and social science literature can be incorporated into the definition of resilient infrastructure so that considerations of social justice can be accounted for and addressed more adequately. Building on the view that engineering ultimately aims to promote societal well-being, this paper argues that human well-being depends on (1) the resilience of the physical infrastructure and (2) the socioeconomic context, both of which in turn affect (i) how the impact and recovery of the physical infrastructure translates into societal impact and recovery and (ii) the ability of individuals to recover/adapt independently from the recovery of the physical infrastructure. The paper suggests that a capability approach may be a suitable framework for providing content to the formal concept of resilience as a capability approach is especially suitable for expressing non-tangible damage that might be caused by natural hazards and disasters.
2018
Wexler, Lesley; Robbennolt, Jennifer K.; Murphy, Colleen
#MeToo, Time's Up, and Theories of Justice Working paper
University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-14, 2018, ISSN: 1556-5068.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: restorative justice, transitional justice, workplace
@workingpaper{Wexler2018,
title = {#MeToo, Time's Up, and Theories of Justice},
author = {Lesley Wexler and Jennifer K. Robbennolt and Colleen Murphy},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3135442},
issn = {1556-5068},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-06},
urldate = {2018-03-06},
issue = {18-14},
publisher = {Elsevier BV},
abstract = {Allegations against movie-mogul Harvey Weinstein and the ensuing #MeToo movement opened the floodgates to a modern day reckoning with sex discrimination in the workplace. High level and high profile individuals across industries have been fired, suspended, and resigned. At the same time, serious concerns have been raised about useful processes for non-privileged women, due process for those accused of misconduct, and the need for proportionate consequences. And there have been calls for both restorative and transitional justice in addressing this problem. But these calls have not been explicit about what sort of restoration or transformation is envisioned.
This article explores the meaning, utility, and complexities of restorative and transitional justice for dealing with sexual misconduct in the workplace. We begin by documenting the restorative origins of #MeToo as well as exploring steps taken, most prominently by Time’s Up, to amplify and credit survivors’ voices, seek accountability, change workplace practices, and encourage access to the legal system. We then take up the call for restorative justice by exploring its key components — including acknowledgement, responsibility-taking, harm repair, non-repetition, and reintegration — with an eye toward how these components might apply in the context of addressing sexual harassment in the workplace.
We conclude by looking more broadly to the insights of transitional justice. We identify some shared features of transitional societies and the #MeToo setting, including structural inequalities, a history of denial and the normalization of wrongful behavior, and uncertainty about the way forward. We then provide guidance for ongoing reform efforts. First, we emphasize the vital importance of including and addressing the interests of marginalized groups within the larger movement both because we need to know and acknowledge specific intersectional harms and also because doing so helps model the kinds of equal relationships that marginalized groups seek across other dimensions such as race, sexual orientation, gender orientation, and disability. Second, we highlight the need for holism and mixed types of responses in trying to spur societal change. },
howpublished = {University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-14},
keywords = {restorative justice, transitional justice, workplace},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}
Allegations against movie-mogul Harvey Weinstein and the ensuing #MeToo movement opened the floodgates to a modern day reckoning with sex discrimination in the workplace. High level and high profile individuals across industries have been fired, suspended, and resigned. At the same time, serious concerns have been raised about useful processes for non-privileged women, due process for those accused of misconduct, and the need for proportionate consequences. And there have been calls for both restorative and transitional justice in addressing this problem. But these calls have not been explicit about what sort of restoration or transformation is envisioned.
This article explores the meaning, utility, and complexities of restorative and transitional justice for dealing with sexual misconduct in the workplace. We begin by documenting the restorative origins of #MeToo as well as exploring steps taken, most prominently by Time’s Up, to amplify and credit survivors’ voices, seek accountability, change workplace practices, and encourage access to the legal system. We then take up the call for restorative justice by exploring its key components — including acknowledgement, responsibility-taking, harm repair, non-repetition, and reintegration — with an eye toward how these components might apply in the context of addressing sexual harassment in the workplace.
We conclude by looking more broadly to the insights of transitional justice. We identify some shared features of transitional societies and the #MeToo setting, including structural inequalities, a history of denial and the normalization of wrongful behavior, and uncertainty about the way forward. We then provide guidance for ongoing reform efforts. First, we emphasize the vital importance of including and addressing the interests of marginalized groups within the larger movement both because we need to know and acknowledge specific intersectional harms and also because doing so helps model the kinds of equal relationships that marginalized groups seek across other dimensions such as race, sexual orientation, gender orientation, and disability. Second, we highlight the need for holism and mixed types of responses in trying to spur societal change.
This article explores the meaning, utility, and complexities of restorative and transitional justice for dealing with sexual misconduct in the workplace. We begin by documenting the restorative origins of #MeToo as well as exploring steps taken, most prominently by Time’s Up, to amplify and credit survivors’ voices, seek accountability, change workplace practices, and encourage access to the legal system. We then take up the call for restorative justice by exploring its key components — including acknowledgement, responsibility-taking, harm repair, non-repetition, and reintegration — with an eye toward how these components might apply in the context of addressing sexual harassment in the workplace.
We conclude by looking more broadly to the insights of transitional justice. We identify some shared features of transitional societies and the #MeToo setting, including structural inequalities, a history of denial and the normalization of wrongful behavior, and uncertainty about the way forward. We then provide guidance for ongoing reform efforts. First, we emphasize the vital importance of including and addressing the interests of marginalized groups within the larger movement both because we need to know and acknowledge specific intersectional harms and also because doing so helps model the kinds of equal relationships that marginalized groups seek across other dimensions such as race, sexual orientation, gender orientation, and disability. Second, we highlight the need for holism and mixed types of responses in trying to spur societal change.
2017
Murphy, Colleen
International Criminal Trials and the Circumstances of Justice Journal Article
In: Criminal Law and Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 575–585, 2017, ISSN: 1871-9805.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: international criminal trials, transitional justice
@article{Murphy2017b,
title = {International Criminal Trials and the Circumstances of Justice},
author = {Colleen Murphy},
doi = {10.1007/s11572-017-9441-x},
issn = {1871-9805},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-09-16},
urldate = {2017-09-16},
journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {575--585},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {Transitional justice is broadly understood to refer to formal efforts to deal with past wrongs in the midst of a transition from an extended period of conflict or repression to democracy. In this paper, I consider the role of international criminal trials in transitional justice. I argue that such trials may contribute to transitional justice, but such contributions are conditional on two main factors. The first factor is time. The second factor is what other transitional justice responses are adopted domestically.},
keywords = {international criminal trials, transitional justice},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Transitional justice is broadly understood to refer to formal efforts to deal with past wrongs in the midst of a transition from an extended period of conflict or repression to democracy. In this paper, I consider the role of international criminal trials in transitional justice. I argue that such trials may contribute to transitional justice, but such contributions are conditional on two main factors. The first factor is time. The second factor is what other transitional justice responses are adopted domestically.
2013
Gardoni, Paolo; Murphy, Colleen
A Scale of Risk Journal Article
In: Risk Analysis, vol. 34, no. 7, pp. 1208–1227, 2013, ISSN: 1539-6924.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: risk, risk comparison, risk evaluation
@article{Gardoni2013,
title = {A Scale of Risk},
author = {Paolo Gardoni and Colleen Murphy},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2371068, SSRN},
doi = {10.1111/risa.12150},
issn = {1539-6924},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-12-20},
journal = {Risk Analysis},
volume = {34},
number = {7},
pages = {1208--1227},
publisher = {Wiley},
abstract = {This article proposes a conceptual framework for ranking the relative gravity of diverse risks. This framework identifies the moral considerations that should inform the evaluation and comparison of diverse risks. A common definition of risk includes two dimensions: the probability of occurrence and the associated consequences of a set of hazardous scenarios. This article first expands this definition to include a third dimension: the source of a risk. The source of a risk refers to the agents involved in the creation or maintenance of a risk and captures a central moral concern about risks. Then, a scale of risk is proposed to categorize risks along a multidimensional ranking, based on a comparative evaluation of the consequences, probability, and source of a given risk. A risk is ranked higher on the scale the larger the consequences, the greater the probability, and the more morally culpable the source. The information from the proposed comparative evaluation of risks can inform the selection of priorities for risk mitigation.},
keywords = {risk, risk comparison, risk evaluation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This article proposes a conceptual framework for ranking the relative gravity of diverse risks. This framework identifies the moral considerations that should inform the evaluation and comparison of diverse risks. A common definition of risk includes two dimensions: the probability of occurrence and the associated consequences of a set of hazardous scenarios. This article first expands this definition to include a third dimension: the source of a risk. The source of a risk refers to the agents involved in the creation or maintenance of a risk and captures a central moral concern about risks. Then, a scale of risk is proposed to categorize risks along a multidimensional ranking, based on a comparative evaluation of the consequences, probability, and source of a given risk. A risk is ranked higher on the scale the larger the consequences, the greater the probability, and the more morally culpable the source. The information from the proposed comparative evaluation of risks can inform the selection of priorities for risk mitigation.
2004
Murphy, Colleen
Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law Journal Article
In: Law and Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 239–262, 2004, ISSN: 1573-0522.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: agency, philosophy of law, positivism, rule of law
@article{Murphy2005,
title = {Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law},
author = {Colleen Murphy},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690025, SSRN},
doi = {10.1007/s10982-004-7990-3},
issn = {1573-0522},
year = {2004},
date = {2004-01-15},
journal = {Law and Philosophy},
volume = {24},
number = {3},
pages = {239--262},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {I defend Lon Fuller’s view that the rule of law has conditional non-instrumental as well as instrumental moral value. The rule of law is conditionally non-instrumentally valuable in virtue of how a legal system structures political relationships},
keywords = {agency, philosophy of law, positivism, rule of law},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
I defend Lon Fuller’s view that the rule of law has conditional non-instrumental as well as instrumental moral value. The rule of law is conditionally non-instrumentally valuable in virtue of how a legal system structures political relationships
For a more complete overview of my publications, please visit: